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The requirement of notice prior to suit against governmental entities has
barred the courtroom door to many injured plaintiffs. In this Article, Mr.
Corboy traces the development of statutory pre-suit notice requirements
and analyzes their purpose and scope. The author notes and encourages
the recent trend of legislative amendments and liberal judicial interpre-
tations which have ameliorated the harsh and final effect of the notice pro-
visions, but at the same time, have fulfilled their legislative purpose.
STATE NOTICE PROVISIONS
There lies in wait for every injured plaintiff seeking redress from a gov-
ernmental entity in Illinois the snare of notice. Often unexpected, this legal
trap presents a great danger to the unwary attorney, for failure to comply
with statutory notice requirements is generally fatal to a claim. 1 A client
with a compensable claim which has been barred can then obtain compensa-
tion only by retaliating against his attorney in a malpractice action. The out-
come of this litigation is predictable. Notice provisions are statutory and thus
set out clearly (though not always logically). Therefore, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for an attorney to seek refuge behind the shield of professional
judgment after failing to notify a defendant. 2  Even where representation
has been declined, an attorney must be wary of advising claimants of periods
of limitation without also advising of notice requirements. The purpose of
this Article is to examine the means by which an injured plaintiff and his
* Senior Partner, Philip H. Corboy and Associates; undergraduate education, St. Ambrose
College & University of Notre Dame; J.D., Loyola University. The author wishes to express his
grateful appreciation to: Robert Drummond, B.A., Loyola University; J.D., DePaul University;
and Michael W. Rathsack, B.S., University of Wisconsin; J.D., University of Illinois; for their
research assistance.
f Whenever the male pronoun is used in this Article, it is intended to apply to the female
gender also.
1. If the required notice of injury is not provided, civil actions against local governmental
entities must be dismissed with prejudice. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-103 (1977). Other
specific statutory provisions are: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1977), which mandates the
same result for failure to notify in suits against the Chicago Transit Authority; and ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, § 439.22-2 (1977), which requires notice prior to suit against the state.
In actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976), filing of an adminis-
trative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and failure to timely comply results in dismissal of
the claim with prejudice. Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 289, 291 (1977) (per curiam).
2. Attorneys are presumed to have full knowledge of the statutes of the states in which
they practice. See, e.g., In re Woods, 158 Tenn. 383, 13 S.W.2d 800 (1929); Citizens' Loan
Fund & Savings Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890).
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attorney can satisfy the notice requirements in actions against the State of
Illinois, local governmental entities, and the federal government.
There are notice requirements for claims against municipalities, 3 the State
of Illinois, 4 the Chicago Transit Authority, 5 sanitary districts, 6 and county
highway superintendents. 7 Each of these entities is covered by a separate
statutory notice provision, requiring the claimant's attorney to tailor notice
to the specific provisions of the applicable statute. Prior to suing one of
these entities, an injured plaintiff must serve it with proper notice. To be
proper, the notice must be a signed, 8 written 9 statement containing desig-
nated information 10 relating to the claim presented. The information re-
quirements of the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act" are generally representative of most notice
statutes. That Illinois statute requires that an injured plaintiff give his name
and address, the time, place and nature of the accident, and the names and
addresses of the attending physician and hospital. 12 Although the informa-
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1977).
4. ILL, REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.22-1 (1977), requires notice to the state in actions for
personal injuries. In addition, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8(d) (1977), gives exclusive juris-
diction over such actions against the state to the Illinois Court of Claims. The Illinois Court of
Claims is created in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.1 (1977). Certain actions considered to be
against the state recently have been redefined in Watson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 68 I11. App. 3d
1048, 386 N.E.2d 885 (1st Dist. 1979) (an action filed against state-employed physicians is not an
action against the state and the state is not the real party in interest; therefore the action may
be brought in circuit court).
5. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1977).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42, § 252 (1977).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 383 (1977).
8. The Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act and the Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority Act require that the notice be signed by the injured party, or by his
agent or attorney. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341
(1977). The signature requirement is strictly construed. Minnis v. Friend, 360 Ill. 328, 196
N.E. 191 (1935); Hayes v. Chicago Transit Auth., 340 I11. App. 375, 92 N.E.2d 174 (1st Dist.
1950). The Court of Claims Act omits the signature requirement. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 439.22-1 (1977).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch, 85, § 8-102 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1977). The
Court of Claims does not require the notice to be in writing, but Rule 5(b) of the Practice Rules
of the Court of Claims requires that claimant attach to his complaint copies of the notices served
by him pursuant to chapter 37, § 439.22-1 (1977). Consequently, compliance with this rule
necessitates that the plaintiff's notice be in writing.
10. See note 12 and accompanying text infra.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-101 et. seq. (1977). The Act defines "local public entity" as
a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school board, forest
preserve district, park district, fire protection district, or any other local governmental body.
The definition does not include the state or any office, officer, department, division, board,
commission, university, or similar state agency. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-206 (1977).
See Note, Torts-Sovereign Immunity-The Government's Liability for Tortious Conduct
Arising From Proprietary Functions, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 302 (1970) [hereinafter cited as The
Government's Liability]; Comment, Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort mIn-
munity Act-An Overreaction to Harvey, 4 J. MAR. L.J. 111 (1970).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1977).
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tion required by other Illinois notice statutes is similar, 1 3 the period of limi-
tations governing the timeliness of notice varies among the statutes from six
months 14 to one year, 15 with no apparent reason for the variation.
Historical Analysis
Absent a historical analysis, the limitations established by the notice stat-
utes would appear to represent only an unwarranted attempt by gov-
ernmental entities to avoid responsibilities imposed by the common law on
the remainder of society. Actually, the notice statutes emerged as one re-
sponse to the assault on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.16 By virtue of
that doctrine, state governmental units had possessed absolute immunity
from liability for the acts or omissions of employees acting within the scope
of their employment.
One case which dealt head-on with the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity was Molitor v. Kaneland.17 There, the Illinois Supreme Court
rhetorically questioned why a quasi-municipal corporation, such as a school
district, might be excused from liability while an individual or private corpo-
ration was forced to appear in court and defend itself.' Although the facts
of Molitor dealt only with limiting school district tort immunity, its obvious
consequence was to destroy the general viability of the doctrine of gov-
ernmental tort immunity. In response19 to Molitor, the Illinois Legislature
13. A significant difference in the requirements arises in suits against the employee in his
individual capacity. If the tortfeasor was an agent of a local governmental entity and the act or
omission occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his employment, statutory
notice must be tendered to preserve the claim against the employee. Dear v. Locke, 128 111.
App. 2d 356, 262 N.E.2d 27 (2d Dist. 1970); Smith v. Glowacki, 122 111. App. 2d 336, 258
N.E.2d 591 (4th Dist. 1970). The term "employee" includes an officer, member of the board,
commission, or committee, whether or not compensated, but the definition does not include an
independent contractor. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1977). If the action is brought against
an agent of the State of Illinois in his individual capacity, there is no requirement of notice to
the principal-state governmental entity. The problem facing the plaintiff in an action against a
state agent is whether the claim is in fact a suit against the state, subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Illinois Court of Claims, and consequently requires notice. See Golden v.
Holaday, 59 I11. App. 3d 866, 376 N.E.2d 92 (3d Dist. 1978); Madden v. Kuehn, 56 Ill. App. 3d
997, 372 N.E.2d 1131 (2d Dist. 1978).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.22-1 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1977).
Notably, the statute of limitations for the latter section is one year.
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1977).
16. The origin of this doctrine in the common law was the theory, allied with the divine
right of kings, that the king could do no wrong. It was felt to be a contradiction of his
sovereignty to allow suit to be brought against him in his own courts. Crisp v. Thomas, 63
L.T.R. (n.s.) 756 (1890). See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRs 970 (4th ed. 1971); E. Kronka,
The King is Dead, Long Live the King: State Sovereign Immunity inl Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 660
(1971); The Government's Liability, note 11 supra.
17. 18 I11. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
18. Id. at 20, 163 N.E.2d at 93.
19. 1I. at 29, 163 N.E.2d at 98.
1979]
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quickly granted tort immunity to several governmental entities. 20  On initial
examination then, it might appear that the notice statutes were efforts by
municipal entities to reclaim the protection that was provided previously by
the sovereign immunity doctrine. This is not wholly correct. Indeed, notice
provisions have a valid historical basis. Municipal entities, because they
were subject to an extraordinary number of lawsuits, believed that they
needed to be allowed to investigate and settle claims promptly in order to
avoid the expenses of litigation where settlement could be achieved 21 and to
establish a budget for taxation purposes. 22  Early notice presumably allowed
a municipality the time to investigate a claim and ascertain the facts while
evidence and memories were still fresh. 23  Under these circumstances the
municipality could, if it so desired, settle those claims which appeared valid
before expending time and money on their defense. If a major impact on the
municipality's budget seemed likely, it could be taken into account in plan-
ning future budgets. These purposes were achieved by means of municipal
notice statutes as early as 1905.24
Moreover, because municipal entities were thought to have an inherently
greater exposure to suits than private individuals, the logic that supported
early notice, thus allowing prompt investigation, also buttressed the argu-
ment that municipalities needed special protection from surprise at trial. The
requirement of notice allowed a municipal unit a partial mode of discovery, a
method of trial preparation not generally available to litigants in Illinois until
1933.25 Prior to that time, discovery as known today did not exist. A
defendant municipal entity would have only that information available from
20. This opinion was announced on May 21, 1959. In response to it, the legislature, by an
overwhelming vote, adopted five bills granting tort immunity to: park districts, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 105, §§ 12.1-1, 491 (1959); counties, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (1959); forest preserve
districts, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57-1/2, § 3a (1959); and the Chicago Park District, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 105, § 333.2a (1959). It also passed a bill granting limited tort immunity to school
districts and nonprofit private schools. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 821-31 (1959); Molitor v.
Kaneland, 18 I11. 2d 11, 42, 163 N.E.2d 89, 104 (1959).
21. Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 I11. 2d 288, 293, 348 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1976) (defective
notice cured by prompt filing of suit; substantial compliance may be suflicient); King v. Johnson,
47 I11. 2d 247, 250-51, 265 N.E.2d 874, 875-76 (1970) (constitutionality of notice provisions
upheld, as they impose tort liability on all governmental entities on a fair and orderly basis).
22. King v. Johnson, 47 I11. 2d 247, 251, 265 N.E.2d 874, 876 (1976).
23. One purpose served by notice statutes is to allow the governmental entity to make a
timely investigation into the facts surrounding an injury which may subsequently result in litiga-
tion. By forcing injured parties to give notice of injury within six months, the governmental
body is enabled to locate witnesses and interview them while the facts are still fresh. Further-
more, in a shorter period it is likely that conditions have not materially changed. Hinz v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 133 II1. App. 2d 642, 645, 273 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1971). Accord, Swenson
v. City of Aurora, 196 I11. App. 83, 93 (1915); Seaton v. State, 25 I11. Ct. Cl. 291 (1966).
24. The first statutory notice provisions were enacted in Illinois in 1905. 1905-06 I11. Laws
111, §§ 1-2.
25. The current discovery provision is found at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58, and ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 201-19 (1977).
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the complaint and through its own discovery, 26 making settlement of litiga-
tion difficult and trial often a gamble.
Notice as a Condition Precedent
Originally the service of a notice conforming with statutory requirements
was a condition precedent to bringing an action against a municipal en-
tity.2 7 Although there clearly existed a common law right of action for dam-
ages against municipal units, courts nevertheless strictly construed the notice
statutes to establish that provision of notice was necessary to create the
cause of action. Even where suit was filed against a municipality well before
the period within which notice was required, it was necessary to plead that
the requisite statutory notice had been given in order to avoid dismissal of
the action. In Erford v. City of Peoria,28 suit was filed one month after the
date of injury, but no notice had been given. The Illinois Supreme Court
stated: "Statutes of this character are mandatory, and the giving of the notice
is a condition precedent to the right to bring such suit, and the giving of the
notice must be averred and proved by the plaintiff to avoid a dismissal of his
suit." 29 Consequently, not only was it necessary to give notice before the
right to sue existed, but it was also necessary to plead and prove that notice
had been given. 3
0
The first derogation of the concept of notice as a condition precedent to
suit came indirectly in Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.3 1 The prin-
cipal issue before the Illinois Supreme Court in Haymes was whether the
notice requirements of the School Tort Liability Act were binding on
minors. 32  The Chicago Archbishop, as defendant, argued that the Act
26. Prior to the enactment of the first notice statutes in the Civil Practice Act of 1933,
presuit notice was arguably necessary for the governmental entity to preserve its fiscal integrity.
Modern liberal pretrial discovery did not exist. The only available discovery was the bill of
particulars, and it was seldom obtained in actions for common law negligence. Saragusa v. City
of Chicago, 63 I11. 2d 288, 295-96, 348 N.E.2d 176, 181 (1976). See Whittington v. National
Lead Co., 236 I11. App. 104, 107-08 (1925).
27. Erford v. City of Peoria, 229 I11. 546, 82 N.E. 374 (1907), overruled on other grounds,
Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit School Dist. No. 1, 35 111. 2d 362, 366, 220 N.E.2d
161, 163 (1966).
28. 229 111. 546, 82 N. E. 374 (1907).
29. Id. at 553, 82 N.E. at 376.
30. It is elementary that a declaration must allege all the circumstances necessary for the
support of the action, and that ifany act is to be done by the plaintiffbefore the accruing
of the defendant's liability, the performance of that act must be averred. A declaration
which fails to allege a fact without whose existence the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
does not state a cause of action. In other states having a statute similar to ours the courts
have frequently decided that the giving of notice is an essential part of the cause of
action, and that without an averment of the fact of notice a complaint does not state
facts sufficient to state a cause of action.
Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 I11. 259, 264, 88 N.E. 651, 653 (1909).
31. 33 Il. 2(1 425, 211 N.E.2d 690 (1965).
32. Id. at 428, 211 N.E.2d at 692. The defendant argued that the liability imposed on
schools parallels dramshop and wrongful death actions, both of which require timely filing of
1979]
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created a new cause of action subject to the condition precedent prescribed
in the Act. The court noted, however, that the Act did not create a new
cause of action, but only imposed certain limitations on the right to re-
cover.3 3  In so holding, this case established the principle that the notice
statutes were clearly in derogation of the common law, thus obligating the
courts to strictly construe the notice requirements against public entities.
3 4
A liberal construction of the notice requirements was forthcoming in
Housetwright v. City of LaHarpe.35  There the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the defense of failure to furnish notice in accordance with the notice
statute was subject to waiver.36 Specifically, failure to provide notice pur-
suant to the dictates of the statute could not be asserted as a defense by a
municipal unit which was insured against the alleged negligence.3 7  As a
result, the giving of notice could not now be construed as a condition prece-
dent, for as such it could not have been waived.
Shortly thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the notice re-
quired in suits against local public entities M was a provision of limitation, as
previously described in Hayines,3 9 and not a condition precedent.4 1 There-
fore, the filing of suit by the public entity could, and in fact did, act as a
waiver of the notice requirement for purposes of defendant's counterclaim
against the public entity. 4 1  This interpretation has been followed and ex-
suit as a condition of liability. Id. See Lowrey v. Malkowski, 20 Ill. 2d 280, 170 N.E.2d 147
(1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 879 (1961); Wilson v. Tromly, 404 III. 307, 89 N.E.2d 22 (1949).
33. Havnes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 33 II1. 2d 425, 428, 211 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1965).
34. Id. "In consideration of this statute we are also guided by the fact that the Local Gov-
ernment and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act is in derogation of the common-law
action against local public entities and must, therefore, be strictly construed against the local
public entity." Reynolds v. City of Tuscola, 48 111. 2d 339, 342, 270 N.E.2d 415, 417 (1971).
Accord, Williams v. Medical Center Comm'n, 60 I11. 2d 389, 328 N.E.2d 1 (1975) (improperly
filing tort action in circuit court rather than court of claims satisfied the statutory requirement of
notice of filing).
35. 51 111. 2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972).
36. ld. at 365, 282 N.E.2d at 442. The notice statute was set forth in ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
85, § 8-102 (1969). The waiver provision was contained in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103(b)
(1969).
37. Housewright v. City of LaHarpe, 51 111. 2d 357, 365, 282 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1972).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1977).
39. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
40. Helle v. Brush, 53 111. 2d 405, 410, 292 N.E.2d 372, 375 (1973).
41. Id.
In Housewright v. City of LaHarpe (1972), 51 111. 2d 357, we held that the local
public entity had the power to waive the notice requirement of Section 8-102. Also
see Fanio v. John W. Breslin Co. (1972), 51 111. 2d 366, 369-70. If such notice were
mandatory and a condition precedent to the right to bring suit, then it could not be
waived. Consequently, we hold the notice provision of Section 8-102 not to be a
condition precedent to the right to bring suit, but rather to be a limitation provision
which can be waived by the local public entity, and, under the circumstances of this
case, we regard the filing of suit by the plaintiff public entity as a waiver of this
notice requirement. (Emphasis added).
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panded upon by the First District Appellate Court. 42 No similar liberaliza-
tion, however, has taken place with respect to actions brought in the Court
of Claims, where the giving of notice still remains a condition precedent. 43
Governmental Unit Informational Notice Requirements
Despite the apparent tendency to encourage litigation of claims against gov-
ernmental units on their merits, the courts generally have required strict
compliance with the specific informational requirements of the notice stat-
utes by the claimant. Thus, there exists an apparently contradictory
situation wherein notice itself may be waived by the public entity, but the
informational requirements called for by the applicable statute must be
supplied in exact conformity to the statutory requisites. 44
For example, if a claim against a local public entity is contemplated, the
notice of injury must provide the name of the person to whom the cause of
action has accrued, the name and residence of the person injured, the date
and approximate hour of the accident, the place or location where the acci-
dent occurred, the general nature of the accident, the name and address of
the attending physician and the name and address of the treating hospital or
hospitals. 45 The term "injury" enjoys a broad meaning with regard to local
public entities; it embraces death, injury to a person, and damage to or loss
of property. 46  An action in the Court of Claims against the State of Illinois
for injury to the person requires the same elements of information with the
exception of the name of the hospital. 47 Notice to the Chicago Transit Au-
thority for personal injuries requires the name of the person to whom the
cause of action has accrued, the name and address of the person injured, the
date and approximate hour of the accident, the place or location where the
accident occurred, and the name and address of the attending physician.4 8
However, suits against sanitary districts for damage to property merely re-
quire notice containing the name and address of the property owner, the
location of the property and the extent of the damage. 49  Finally, notice to
42. In sum, we judge that the service of notice is not a condition precedent to the
filing of the complaint; that the notice requirement may be waived or the public
body under some circumstances may be estopped to assert it; and whether the
public body may be estopped is a question of fact to be determined from all the
facts and circumstances.
Dunbar v. Reiser, 26 Ill. App. 3d 708, 712, 325 N.E.2d 440, 444 (1st Dist. 1975), aff'd, 64 I11.
2d 230, 356 N.E.2d 89 (1976).
43. Munch v. State, 25 I11. Ct. Cl. 313 (1966); Seaton v. State, 25 I11. Ct. Cl. 291 (1966).
44. Thomas v. Chicago Transit Auth., 29 IIl. App. 3d 952, 331 N.E.2d 216 (1st Dist. 1975)
(listing the wrong physician held insufficient).
45. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-204 (1977).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.22-1 (1977).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1977).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42, § 252 (1977).
1979]
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the County Superintendent of Highways requires the name of the claimant,
the location of the accident, the nature of the injury and the name and
address of the attending physician. 5
0
Notice must be exact. It would be incorrect to assume that substantial
compliance would save an otherwise defective notice. A notice which com-
pletely omits one or more of the required items is insufficient.5 1 In Thomas
v. Chicago Transit Authority,52 the timely filed notice incorrectly identified
the attending physician. More than one year later, after the matter was in
suit, plaintiff sought to amend the notice by inserting the correct name of
the treating physician. The court denied leave to amend and dismissed the
complaint, holding that the first notice was so insufficient that any sub-
sequent amendment of the notice would be tardy.5 3  Likewise, complete
omission of secondary information is fatal to a plaintiff's claim. For example,
in Zavala v. City of Chicago,54 the notice failed to contain the names of the
two hospitals at which the injured party was treated. Plaintiff argued that the
omission was a de minimis error, as she received only minimal outpatient
care at each hospital, and further, that substantial compliance with the stat-
ute as a whole cured the specific defect. The court rejected both argu-
ments, holding that substantial compliance was inadequate. 55  A further
reason supporting this rationale was that the City was not given that infor-
mation which the legislature clearly felt was necessary in order for the
municipality to estimate the extent of its liability. 56
50. ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 121, § 383 (1977).
51. Bollinger v. Schneider, 64 111. App. 3d 758, 381 N.E.2d 849 (3d Dist. 1978); Thomas v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 29 I11. App. 3d 952, 954, 331 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1st Dist. 1975). Notices
have been found insufficient because of various omissions. See generally Zavala v. City of
Chicago, 66 111. 2d 573, 363 N.E.2d 848 (1977) (failure to list names and addresses of two
treating hospitals); Minnis v. Friend, 360 Ill. 328, 196 N.E. 191 (1935) (unsigned notice);
Nikolic v. City of Chicago, 18 I11. App. 3d 426, 305 N.E.2d 325 (1st Dist. 1973) (nature of
accident omitted); Ramos v. Armstrong, 8 Ill. App. 3d 503, 289 N.E.2d 709 (3d Dist. 1972)
(failure to include plaintiff's address); Hayes v. Chicago Transit Auth., 340 I11. App. 375, 92
N.E.2d 174 (1st Dist. 1950) (signature omitted); Swenson v. City of Aurora, 196 Ill. App. 83 (2d
Dist. 1915) (residence of injured party omitted); Zycinski v. City of Chicago, 163 I11. App. 413
(Ist Dist. 1911) (hour of injury omitted). Accord, Lyons v. Chicago Transit Auth., 349 I11. App.
437, 111 N.E.2d 177 (1st Dist. 1953); Seaton v. State, 25 Ct. Cl. 291 (1966). However, where
suit is filed within six months of the injury, the defect in the notice has not barred the claim.
See Dunbar v. Reiser, 64 I11. 2d 230, 356 N.E.2d 89 (1976); Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill.
2d 288, 348 N.E.2d 176 (1976).
52. 29 II1. App. 3d 952, 331 N.E.2d 216 (1st Dist. 1975). The statute at issue was the
Metropolitan Transit Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1971). This statute is an example
of the Illinois Legislature's reaction to Molitor v. Kaneland, 18 I11. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
See note 20 supra.
53. Thomas v. Chicago Transit Auth., 29 I11. App. 3d 952, 955, 331 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1st
Dist. 1975). The court stated that the notice provision did not contain an amendatory provision.
In addition, the court noted, any amendatory procedure would nullify the purpose of the stat-
ute, i.e., to permit early investigation and prompt settlement. Id.
54. 66 I11. 2d 573, 363 N.E.2d 848 (1977).
55. Id. at 578, 363 N.E.2d at 850.
56. Id.
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Omission of the correct time 5 7 or date 5 8 of the accident also is invariably
fatal. In Williams v. City of Gibson, 59 the notice and complaint alleged that
an accident occurred on April 25, 1965. It later became evident, however,
that the injury occurred on the previous day. The court refused to hold that
substantial compliance was sufficient, reasoning that a more liberal standard
could be set only by the legislature. 60
It is difficult to reconcile these cases with that line of decisions which has
held notice to be sufficient even though individual items of information were
not entirely correct. 6 1  For example, in Klein v. City of Chicago,6 2 notice
was deemed adequate although it inaccurately stated that an accident oc-
curred fifty feet from a street rather than the correct three to five feet. 63
There, notice was upheld because plaintiff's good faith effort to comply was
deemed sufficient to allow reasonably diligent municipal investigators the
opportunity to examine the scene of the accident. 64  Apparently, tort victims
can expect to benefit from a greater degree of latitude with regard to the
sufficiency of the description of location, as investigators are expected to
exercise reasonable diligence in locating the scene and ascertaining the con-
ditions existing at the time of the accident. 65  Even where an incorrect
address is stated, investigators have been required to ascertain a proper ad-
dress where it was only three numbers away and across the street from the
location given. 66
57. Condon v. City of Chicago, 249 111. 596, 94 N.E. 976 (1911); Zycinski v. City of
Chicago, 163 Ill. App. 413 (1st Dist. 1911). See also Swenson v. City of Aurora, 196 I11. App. 83
(2d Dist. 1915) (notice which misstated time of injury by three hours disallowed).
58. Ouimette v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 501, 90 N.E. 300 (1909) (notice invalidated be-
cause of one month error); Rapacz v. Township High School Dist. No. 207, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1095,
1099, 278 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1st Dist. 1971) (typographical error of one year invalidated notice);
Williams v. City of Gibson, 129 I11. App. 2d 431, 433, 263 N.E.2d 138, 139 (4th Dist. 1970)
(notice one day in error insufficient); Frowner v. Chicago Transit Auth., 25 11. App. 2d 312,
167 N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1960) (complaint three days in error invalidated).
59. 129 Ill. App. 2d 431, 263 N.E.2d 138 (4th Dist. 1970).
60. id. at 433-34, 263 N.E.2d at 139.
61. If, considering the whole notice together, it gives sufficient information to city
authorities to enable them by the exercise of reasonable intelligence and diligence
to locate the place of the injury and to ascertain the conditions alleged to have
existed which caused it, it is sufficient according to the weight of the authorities to
serve the purpose for which it was required by the statute to be given.
McComb v. City of Chicago, 263 11. 510, 512, 105 N.E. 294, 294 (1914).
62. 10 I11. App. 3d 670, 294 N.E.2d 755 (1st Dist. 1973).
63. Id. at 674, 294 N.E.2d at 757.
64. Id. at 674-75, 294 N.E.2d at 757-58.
65. The Klein court stated:
We do not believe that the erroneous measurement statistic, under the facts of the
present case, should bar a meritorious claim .... It would not have required great
diligence by the City investigators to have examined the sidewalk on either side of
the specified measurements .... [W]e believe that the City urges too rigid a func-
tion and too rigid a test on notices.
Id. at 674, 294 N.E.2d at 757-58.
66. Redmond v. City of Chicago, 10 Ill. App. 3d 567, 294 N.E.2d 761 (1st Dist. 1973).
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The trend toward liberal construction of the sufficiency of the elements
actually listed in a statutorily required notice6 7 has paralleled some courts'
strict construction of the same elements.68 If there is complete omission,
the notice fails as a matter of law.6 9 Absent complete omission, however,
the test to be applied is whether there was a reasonable attempt to include
the required information. 70  If such an attempt was made, then the claimant
is entitled to have the sufficiency of the attempt examined to determine
whether it substantially fulfilled the requirements of the statute without mis-
leading or prejudicing the local public entity. 71  In one case, a notice fur-
nishing the name of only one of two treating hospitals was found to be suffi-
cient to constitute substantial compliance. 72 This liberal trend had been
furthered by the state legislature when it amended the Tort Immunity Act in
1973 by inserting the words "in substance the following information" into the
listing of required information. 73
Method of Service
Certain procedures must be followed to effect adequate service of no-
tice. Service on local public entities must be made by personal service or by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, on the secretary or
clerk of the entity. 74  Furthermore, the notice must be signed by the claim-
ant, his agent, or his attorney. 75 A claimant against the Chicago Transit
Authority must file a signed written notice with the office of the Secretary of
the Board and the office of the General Counsel for the Authority. 76  Notice
67. Bickel v. City of Chicago, 25 I11. App. 3d 684, 688, 323 N.E.2d 832, 835 (1st Dist.
1975). The Bickel court set forth a historical overview of this liberalizing trend.
68. Id. at 692, 323 N.E.2d at 837-38. See note 51 supra.
69. Id. The Bickel court stressed that strict construction of the statute still requires that the
written notice contain reference to each of the essential items of notice. Bickel v. City of
Chicago, 25 I11. App. 3d 684, 691, 323 N.E.2d 832, 838 (1st Dist. 1975).
70. "Accordingly, here the test to be applied is whether there is some attempt to designate
the [specific element, in the instant case, treating hospital] and if so, the sufficiency of the
designation set forth in the notice." Bickel v. City of Chicago, 25 I11. App. 3d 684, 691, 323
N.E.2d 832, 837 (1975).
71. Thus, the Bickel court held:
The notice contained the name and address of the first hospital at which plaintiff
had been treated, and only omitted the one other hospital where further treatment
was received. The information was sufficiently complete to constitute substantial
compliance with the treating hospital requirement of the statute .... Therefore,
the trial court did not err in holding the notice sufficient.
Id. at 692, 323 N.E.2d at 838.
72. Id. This holding is contrary to the holding in Zavala v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 573,
363 N.E.2d 848 (1977), where the omission of both treating hospitals was fatal to the notice.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1977).
74. Id.
75. See note 8 supra; Gambling v. Cornish, 426 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (allowing an
alias); Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 IIl. 2d 288, 348 N.E.2d 176 (1976) (allowing an unsigned
copy, when the original was signed).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1977).
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also must be filed in the office of the Attorney General and with the Clerk of
the Court of Claims before a claimant can commence an action against the
State in that court. 7 7 In fact, the rules of the Court of Claims require that a
separate copy of such notice be attached to the complaint with a showing of
how and when such notice was served. 78 Yet the method of filing is appar-
ently left to the discretion of the claimant.
Judicial construction of these procedural requisites reflects the view that
the substantive purpose of the notice statutes-to inform the public entity
quickly-is achieved even though some requirements have been over-
looked. For example, the absence of a signature on the copy of a notice left
with the City of Chicago did not invalidate the notice where the original
notice was signed for and marked "received" by the clerk. 79  Similarly, al-
though the Tort Immunity Act prior to 1973 required personal service, 8 0 the
Illinois Supreme Court in Reynolds v. City of Tuscola 81 held that service by
registered mail, return receipt requested, complied with the statutory re-
quirements. 2 The court justified this liberal construction on the basis that
the entity in fact received the notice it needed to begin its investigation.
The court stated:
A liberal interpretation of the statute is necessary because of its position
in relation to the common law and because a more restrictive interpreta-
tion could lead to absurd, inconvenient or unjust consequences. Under
these circumstances we adopt a construction which it is reasonable to pre-
sume was contemplated by the legislature.83
Chief Justice Underwood's dissent in Reynolds emphasizes the court's will-
ingness to liberally construe the statute so as to protect the claimant.8 4 If,
however, the rationale of Reynolds were to be applied to all cases involving
challenges to notice, it would appear that the underlying criterion to be used
in evaluating a challenged notice would be solely the question of whether
the local entity did in fact have actual notice of the statutory elements.
While the author is certainly not opposed to the creative and vigorous appli-
cation of this principle, the practitioner should be aware of its inherent limi-
tations.8 5
77. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
78. ILL. CT. CL. R. 5(B)(1) (1977).
79. Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill. 2d 288, 348 N.E.2d 176 (1976); Klapkowski v. City
of Chicago, 23 111. App. 2d 222, 161 N.E.2d 865 (1st Dist. 1959).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1971).
81. 48 II1. 2d 339, 270 N.E.2d 415 (1971).
82. Id. at 343, 270 N.E.2d at 417.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 343-45, 270 N.E.2d at 417-19.
85. Thomas v. Chicago Transit Auth., 29 I11. App. 3d 952, 331 N.E.2d 216 (1st Dist. 1975)
(listing wrong physician is tantamount to a complete omission of an essential element and thus
fatal to plaintiff's cause of action); Rapacz v. Township High School Dist. No. 207, 2 Ill. App. 3d
1095, 278 N.E.2d 540 (1st Dist. 1971) (erroneous (late of one month did not satisfy statutory
notice requirement, despite plaintiff's claim that the error was typographical); Williams v. City
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Waiver, Estoppel, and Avoidance
Judicial construction of the notice statutes and legislative amendments
thereto have presented the injured claimant and his attorney with several
means by which the statutes' restrictive impact can be avoided. Originally a
public entity could not waive any of its defenses under the Tort Immunity
Act because the notice requirement was construed as a condition precedent
which precluded a finding of waiver.8 6 Once it became clear, however, that
the filing of a statutory notice was a procedural limitation upon the bringing
of an action rather than a condition precedent thereto,8 7 the courts began to
examine the behavior of the public entity, as well as that of the claimant, in
determining both sufficiency and necessity of statutory notice.
The initial provision for waiver of statutory notice rights by local public
entities, at least to the extent of insurance policy limits, was provided by the
state legislature in the Tort Immunity Act."" The legislature denied to in-
surers of public entities the defenses otherwise provided for those entities in
the Act, including the defense of lack of notice.8 9 The first case arising
of Gibson, 129 I11. App. 2d 431, 263 N.E.2d 138 (4th Dist. 1970) (discrepancy of one day in
date of injury did not satisfy statutory notice requirement of date of incident); Frowner v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 25 I11. App. 2(d 312, 167 N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1960) (wrong date is fatal
to notice and thus to plaintiff's cause of action).
86. Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 I11. 259, 263, 88 N.E. 651, 653 (1909); Erford v. City of
Peoria, 229 111. 546, 553, 82 N.E. 374, 376 (1907).
87. Helle v. Brush, 53 111. 2d 405, 410, 292 N.E.2d 372, 375 (1973). Helle involved a suit
brought by a local public entity (highway commission) against a motorist for property damage to
a commission road grader. The issue in the case was whether a timely counterclaim could be
filed by the defendant under the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Im-
munity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1967), whetn the original suit and counterclaim
derived from the same occurrence. Defendant's counterclaim was filed after the expiration of
the statutory period of six months for filing notice of injury. In Helle, the court held that the
defendant's counterclaim was not barred by the notice provision of the Tort Immunity Act. The
statute of limitations did not prevent a party from filing a counterclaim if he was sued by the
party against whom the claim was barred. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 18 (1967). The court
analyzed the purposes of the Act's notice provision. It found that the purpose of avoiding expen-
sive litigation was mooted by the public entity's initiation of the suit. Suit by the entity also
indicated that the facts were not stale. Reynolds v. City of Tuscola, 48 I11. 2d 339, 342, 270
N.E.2d 415, 417 (1971); King v. Johnson, 47 I11. 2d 247, 250-51, 265 N.E.2d 874, 876 (1970);
Thomas v. Chicago Transit Auth., 29 I11. App. 3d 952, 955-56, 331 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1st Dist.
1975). In Helle, the court stated that this purpose must be weighed against the rights of the
person who is sued to have his full day in court. Helle v. Brush, 53 Ill. 2d 405, 408-09, 292
N.E.2d 372, 374 (1973). The court construed the time limitation of § 8-102 as applicable only to
cases where the initial action was commenced by a person against a local public entity. In an
action initiated by the public entity, the notice provisions of § 8-102 are not a prerequisite to
the filing of a counterclaim which arises from the same occurrence.
See also Hull v. City of Griggsville, 29 I11. App. 3d 253, 255, 330 N.E.2d 293, 295 (4th Dist.
1975); Dunbar v. Reiser, 26 II1. App. 3d 708, 710, 325 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1st Dist. 1975); Wood
Acceptance Co. v. King, 18 I11. App. 3d 149, 151, 309 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1st Dist. 1974).
88. ILL. REV. STAr. ch. 85, § 9-103(c) (1977).
89. Section 9-103(c) of the Tort Immunity Act provides:
Every policy for insurance coverage issued to a local public entity shall provide or
be endorsed to provide that the company issuing such policy waives any right to
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under this section was Housewright v. City of LaHarpe,90 in which a claim-
ant did not give notice pursuant to section 8-102, 91 but did allege in his
complaint that the city had contracted for insurance coverage against the
liability sought to be imposed by his action. 92  The court there held that,
since the notice provision was purely statutory, 93 and since in cases of this
type defendants were not allowed to assert the lack of notice defense, 94 the
defense was thereby waived. 95
As a result, the purchase of liability insurance by a local public entity
waives the requirement of notice prior to filing suit.96 There are, however,
three significant limitations upon this provision. First, the waiver resulting
from the purchase of liability insurance applies exclusively to the defenses
and immunities provided in the Local Governmental and Governmental
refuse payment or to deny liability thereto within the limits of said policy by reason
of the non-liability of the insured public entity for the wrongful or negligent acts of
itself or its employees and its immunity from suit by reason of the defenses and
immunities provided in this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103(c) (1977). For a discussion of the constitutionality of § 9-103
and proposed alternatives, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Section 9-103 of the Local
Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 137
(1973).
90. 51 111. 2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972). For a discussion of Housewright, see Leck, Notice
Requirements of Chap. 85, Sec. 8-102-What Must Be Done Before Suit Is Filed Against a
Local Public Entity, 64 ILL. B.J. 468, 474 (1976); West, Immunity from the Tort Immunity Act,
62 ILL. B.J. 496 (1974).
91. Housewright v. City of LaHarpe, 51 I11. 2d 357, 359, 282 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1972).
92. Id. at 361, 282 N.E.2d at 440.
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1971). The court in Housewright found this statutory
derivation significant:
For the reason that the defense or immunity which results from failure to comply
with section 8-102 exists solely because of that section of the Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act and because it is not excepted from the "immunity
from suit by reason of the defense and immunities provided in this Act" provided in
section 9-103(b), [9-103(c) (1977)], we hold that the failure to give notice in accord-
ance with section 8-102 is subject to the waiver provision of section 9-103(b).
51 111. 2d at 365, 282 N.E.2d at 442.
The court applied the doctrine of Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), in holding that, absent a
statute, there would not be a requirement of notice as provided in section 8-102. It also fol-
lowed the rationale of Ouimette v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 501, 90 N.E. 300 (1909), where it
was held that "the question of notice is entirely within legislative control." Id. at 507, 90 N.E.
at 302. Consequently, also within legislative control is the question of whether immunity from
liability created by § 8-103 for failure to comply with the notice provisions of § 8-102 can be
waived by reason of § 9-103(b).
For a discussion of Molitor and the prior history of tort immunity in Illinois, see Comment,
Governmental Immunity in Illinois: The Molitor Decision and the Legislative Reaction, 54 Nw.
U.L. REV. 588 (1959).
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103(c) (1977). See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
95. Housewright v. City of LaHarpe, 51 III. 2d 357, 365, 282 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1972).
96. Id. at 357, 282 N.E.2d at 437; Fanio v. John W. Breslin Co., 51 11. 2d 366, 282 N.E.2d
443 (1972); Borkoski v. Tumilty, 52 I11. App. 3d 839, 368 N.E.2d 136 (3d Dist. 1977); Crowe v.
Doyle, 6 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 287 N.E.2d 99 (3d Dist. 1972).
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Employees Tort Immunity Act 97 and will not waive the notice requirements
in actions against the State of Illinois or the Chicago Transit Authority. 98
Second, the purchase of liability insurance will waive the defense of defec-
tive notice only up to the limits of liability contained within the policy. 99
Finally, the purchase of liability insurance by the employee, as opposed to
the entity, will not operate as a waiver by the entity of the defenses pro-
vided in section 8-103.100
The holding in Housewright 101 enabled the Illinois Supreme Court in
Helle v. Brush 102 to reason that the waiver in Housewright could not have
occurred if statutory notice was a condition precedent to suit.1 0 3  In Helle, a
See West, Immunity from the Tort Immunity Act, 62 ILL. B.J. 496 (1974). West argues that
"any" in section 9-103(b) is to be construed as "all" immunities are waived.
97. The procurement of insurance does not preclude a public entity from raising a defense
that existed prior to the Tort Immunit' Act. See Lansing v. County of McLean, 69 I11. 2d 562,
372 N.E.2d 822 (1978) (§ 3-105 of the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-105 (1975), codifies the preexisting judicially created
rule of nonliability of local governmental entities for certain damages caused by weather condi-
tions, and this is not waived by the purchase of insurance); Tanari v. School Directors of Dist.
No. 502, 69 I11. 2d 630, 373 N.E.2d 5 (1977) (an educator's statutory immunity, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 85, § 24-24 (1971), from a student's suit for ordinary negligence is not waived by the
public entity's purchase of insurance); Mora v. State, 68 I11. 2d 223, 369 N.E.2d 868 (1977) (the
Tort Immunity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 2-201, 3-104 (1975), and case law provides that a
state employee's immunity from personal liability for the performance of his discretionary duties
is not defeated by the purchase of insurance); Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 Ill. 2d
165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976) (§ 9-103 provisions for waiver do not apply to preexisting im-
munities conferred on educators by the School Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-
84(a) (1967)).
98. Specifically excluded from the definition of a local public entity is "the State or any
office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission, university or similar agency of
the State." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-206 (1977).
Section 2-101 of chapter 85 provides with respect to the Chicago Transit Authority: "Nothing
in this Act affects the liability, if any, of a local public entity or public employee, based on: ...
(b) operation as a common carrier; and this Act does not apply to any entity organized under or
subject to the Metropolitan 'Transit Authority Act' ...." See Fujimura v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 67 I11. 2d 506, 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977) (court upheld as constitutional a six month notice-
of-claim period and one year statute of limitations for personal injury claims against the Chicago
Transit Authority, although a one year notice-of-claim period and a two year statute of limita-
tions were applicable to local governmental units generally under the Tort Immunity Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-101, 102 (1973)).
99. Section 9-103(c) only precludes the insurer from raising the defenses and immunities of
the Act: "Every policy for insurance coverage issued to a local public entity shall provide or be
endorsed to provide that the company issuing such policy waives any right to refuse payment or
to deny liability thereto within the limits of said policy." Beyond the limits of the policy the
entity is free to assert the defenses and immunities of the Act.
100. Section 9-103(c) expressly applies only to those policies issued to the "local public en-
tity." See Eason v. Garfield Park Community Hosp., 55 111. App. 3d 483, 487, 370 N.E.2d
1099, 1102 (1st Dist. 1977).
101. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
102. 53 Ill. 2d 405, 292 N.E.2d 372 (1973).
103. Id. at 410, 292 N.E.2d at 375. Obviously the court could also have reasoned that no
waiver existed, but rather that the state legislature had simply created a statutory exception to
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private individual who was sued by a highway commissioner filed a counter-
claim without first filing notice pursuant to section 8-103. The court found
that filing notice was not a prerequisite to an individual's counterclaim aris-
ing from the same occurrence. In so holding, the court reasoned that the
public entity had waived the limitation provided by the notice requirement
when it filed suit as plaintiff. Specifically, the court stated:
We construe the limitation of section 8-102 to apply only to those cases
where the initial action is in fact commenced by any person against a local
public entity, and we hold that in an action commenced by the local entity
against the defendant, the serving of the notice required by this section is
not a requisite to the filing of a counterclaim arising from the same occur-
rence.
Consequently, we hold the notice provision of section 8-102 not to be a
condition precedent to the right to bring suit, but rather to be a limitation
provision which can be waived by the local public entity, and, under the
circumstances of this case, we regard the filing of suit by the plaintiff pub-
lic entity as a waiver of this notice requirement.104
This holding is significant in two respects. First, it suggests that a claimant
who would otherwise be denied his day in court due to failure to comply
with notice requirements may preserve his cause of action if his attorney can
fashion an argument that suggests waiver or estoppel by the public entity.
The courts may be receptive to such arguments where the public entity was
aware of the incident which led to the claim and would not be prejudiced by
an absence of a formal notice. Second, the effect of this decision is to sever
the notice requirement from the plaintiff's cause of action, establishing it
instead as an afirmative defense to be construed in relation to the general
limitations statute. 105 It would be premature to suggest that a plaintiff need
no longer plead and prove proper tender of notice, but it is now clear that
this requirement is subject to the counter-defenses of waiver 10 6 and estop-
pel. 107
the notice requirement, as would be within its power, leaving the notice requirement as a
condition precedent applicable in all instances except those where insurance was purchased.
The court could have achieved the same result in a limited opinion. The liberal construction
served notice that well-reasoned attacks on the notice provisions may bear fruit.
104. Id. at 409-10, 292 N.E.2d at 375.
105. As the court in Helle explained: "Sections 8-101, 8-102, and 8-103 of the Tort Immunity
Act and Section 17 of the Limitations Act are in pari materia and should be construed together
in determining the intent of the legislature relative to the issue under consideration." Id. at
408, 292 N.E.2d at 374. See also Eason v. Garfield Park Community Hosp., 55 Il. App. 3d
483, 492, 370 N.E.2d 1099, 1105-1106 (1st Dist. 1977) (Simon, J., dissenting) (dissent argues
hospital had full knowledge of facts and access to information concerning treatment; therefore,
notice requirement should be held waived because its informational purpose had already been
accomplished).
106. Hull v. City of Griggsville, 29 Ill. App. 3d 253, 330 N.E.2d 293 (4th Dist. 1975) (city
waived issue of defective notice by failure to move for dismissal after filing of amended com-
plaint or in post-trial motions).
107. Dunbar v. Reiser, 26 Ill. App. 3d 708, 712, 325 N.E.2d 440, 443 (1st Dist. 1975), aff'd,
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Even more significant than the development of the waiver and estoppel
doctrines is the development of the rule that the filing of a complaint within
the notice period satisfies the requirements of section 8-102.108 This rule of
construction represents a complete departure fiom those cases which held
that actual notice was not a defense where the statutory notice was insuffi-
cient. 109 It was first adopted in cases in which the statutory notice was
defective. The Illinois Supreme Court has reasoned that filing suit cures the
defect in the notice because the defendant entity is then able to instigate a
complete investigation through use of discovery and, as a result, be in a
better position than if it had only statutorily sufficient notice.10 The court,
however, removed any doubt as to whether the new rule was related to the
"substantial compliance" doctrine when it firmly established the proposition
that filing suit satisfied statutory notice requirements even where no notice
was filed."1
64 111.21 230, 356 N.E.2d 89 (1976); Hinz v. Chicago Transit Auth., 133 111. App. 2d 642, 326
N.E.2d 775 (1st Dist. 1971). The appellate court in Dunbar explained:
[W]e believe the procedural conduct of the defendant in this case raises a fact
question of estoppel that cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss. The Cit'
had to know of any defect inl the pleadings belore its original motion to dismiss and
before its subsequent answers; but it was not uintil ten (10) days after the expiration
of the statutory period [to provide notice] that it served notice ol tie plaintiff of its
motion [to dismiss for failure to provide noticel.
26 I11. App. 31 at 712, 325 N.E.2d at 443. See also Repasky v. Chicago Transit Auth., 9 111.
App. 3d 897, 293 N.E.2d 440 (1st Dist. 1973), aff d, 60 Ill. 2d 185, 189, 326 N.E.2d 771, 777
(1975). It Repasky, the injured plaintiff did not serve notice bsecause a C.T.A. emplovee had
allegedly assured her over the telephone that her case was being "taken care of." The Supreme
Court held it was not persuaded that tle conduct of an employec could operate gelerally to
eliminate the requirement of notice. Id. at 189, 326 N.E.2d at 777 (1975).
108. Dunbar v. Reiser, 64 Ill. 21 230, 236, 356 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (1976).
109. Significantly, the Supreme Court in H ousewrigh t v. City of LaHarpe, 51 Il1. 2d 357,
361, 282 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1972), had onh" four vears earlier stressed: -Section 8-102 is unam-
biguous and clearly expresses the legislative intent that a local public entity be given certain
inforlnation in writing, within the time period provided, and we hold that the allegation of
actual notice does not satisf\' the statutory require sment of written notice." Accord, Repasky v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 60 Ill. 2d 185, 188, 326 N. E.2d 771, 773 (1975); 1layes v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 340 I1. App. 375, 92 N.E.2d 174 (lst Dist. 1950); Thomas v. State, 24 III. Ct.
Cl. 137 (1961).
110. Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill. 2(1 288, 348 N.E.2d 176 (1976). There, the court
held:
Under our discovery procedures, a defendant iiay commence an iniluir\ into the
relevant falcts by serving interrogatories as soon as the delendanl's appearanice or
answer is filed, as was (lone here. The information Iearig itpon the defedaln t's
liability which nay be obtained in this manner will he morc complete than what
would he obtained under the generalized specifications called for ill statutor
notice.
id. at 293-94, 348 N.E.2d at 180.
111. Dunbar v. Reiser, 64 Ill. 21 230, 237, 356 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1976). The court tersely
noted: "[V]e hold that the filing of a complaint within the six monits period satisfied the notice
requirement of § 8-102 of the Tort lnlunisity Act. ... Accord, Williams v. Medical Center
Comn', 60 111. 21 389, 396, 328 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975).
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Arguably, this new rule of construction provides a precedent which can be
applied to hold that actual notice will operate as a waiver of statutory notice
requirements. Certainly this rule contradicts the reasoning' of those prior
cases in which the courts have strictly interpreted the legislative require-
ment that certain information be furnished to the entity by statutory
notice. 1 12 If the opportunity to conduct discovery satisfies statutory notice
requirements, it is illogical to contend that actual notice cannot serve the
same purpose. Both the statutory notice and the complaint serve to alert the
public entity that a claim has been commenced.113  It would be absurd to
suggest that a city would wait until receiving statutory notice of a claim
before conducting an investigation, rather than proceeding with an investiga-
tion immediately upon actual notice of the incident. Despite holdings to the
contrary, 114 it seems reasonable to predict that actual no. ice 115 will eventu-
ally be held to satisfy the notice statutes.
Exceptions
Several exceptions to the notice requirements arise due to either the legal
status of the person injured or the type of injury suffered. Although not
expressly excluded from the requirement of providing notice, infants and
incompetents are under no obligation to give notice prior to commencement
of a suit. 116 Also, the Local Government and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act requires notice for all actions sounding in tort whether
they are for death, personal injury, or damage to property. 1 17 However, a
plaintiff is not required to give notice to the Chicago Transit Authority for
wrongful death or damage to property, as the notice provisions of this statute
apply exclusively to actions involving injuries to the person. 118 Further-
112. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
113. In Dunbar v. Reiser, 64 I11. 2d 230, 235, 356 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1976), the court observed:
"The notice statute, since its original enactment, has been designed to give the local public
entity notice, not that an injury was suffered, but that a person 'is about to commence [a] civil
action for damages on account of such injury., "
114. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
115. Actual notice connotes notice which is sufficient to allow the entity to conduct an inves-
tigation and obtain the information sought to be elicited by the statutory notice requirements.
116. See generally Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 33 Il1. 2d 425, 211 N.E.2d 690
(1965); McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 I11. 52, 120 N.E. 476 (1918). But see Fanio v.
John W. Breslin Co., 51 111. 2d 366, 282 N.E.2d 443 (1972) (holding administrator in a wrongful
death action to the notice requirement where the next of kin were minors); Addison v. Health
and Hosp. Governing Comm'n, 56 Ill. App. 3d 533, 371 N.E.2d 1060 (1st Dist. 1977) (same).
117. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-204 (1977). The statute defines injury as:
death, injury to a person, or damage to or loss of property. It includes any other
injury that a person may suffer to his person, reputation, character, or estate which
does not result from circumstances in which a privilege is otherwise conferred by
law and which is of such a nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a private
person.
118. See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1977). Accord, Prouty v. City of
Chicago, 250 Il. 222, 95 N.E. 147 (1911) (an action for wrongful death is not an action for
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more, a plaintiff is not required to give notice in an action against the State
of Illinois for injury to property,119 but in an action for wrongful death it is
specifically required that the executor give notice within six months of the
date of death. 120
Miscellaneous Statutory Notice Requirements
There are numerous other statutory notice provisions in Illinois. Most of
the remaining statutes, however, do not have quite so harsh a final effect on
the rights of injured parties because of either legislative enactment or judi-
cial interpretation.' 2 1  For example, the Crime Victims Compensation
Act 122.requires that notice be given the State by victims. That Act, how-
ever, requires only that notice of intent to file a claim be filed in the Office
of the Attorney General within six months of the date of injury.'1 23
Another example of liberal notice requirements can be found in the
Workmen's Compensation Act. 124 As a prerequisite to recovery, it requires
that the injured employee give notice to his employer orally or in writing.
The notice should advise the employer of the approximate date of the acci-
dent, as well as its location, and it must be given as soon as practicable, but
not later than forty-five days after the accident. 125 A defect or inaccuracy in
such notice is not a bar to the claim unless the employer proves that he is,
or will be, unduly prejudiced by the defect. 1 26  Employers have seldom
personal injury); Shumpert v. Chicago Transit Auth., 30 11. App. 2d 232, 173 N. E.2d 835 (lst
Dist. 1961) (injury to the person under this section does not include occupational diseases).
119. Munch v. Illinois, 25 Ct. Cl. 313 (1966) (claim for personal injury denied because the
claimant failed to file within the required six months; claim for property damage permitted).
120. See generally ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.22-1 (1977), which states that in a wrongful
death action, the executor, administrator, or personal representative for the estate must file the
name of the person to whom the action has accrued; the natme and last residence of the dece-
dent; the (late, place, and time of the accident causing the death; a description of the accident
and the nates and addresses of the attending physicians and treating hospitals. The filing must
be dm me within six months from the date of death or the (late the person filing is qualified as
executor or administrator of the estate (whichever is later) with the Attorney General amd with
the Clerk of the Court of Claims.
121. See notes 34 and 41 supra.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 71-84 (1977).
123. Id. 7 3 (g). An extension of time is granted if "good cause" is shown. Il.
124. ILL. REv. STm. ch. 48, § 138.1-138.28 (1977).
125. Id. 138. 6 (c). The court has held that the legislature intended to require an employee
to give to his employer all kown facts about the injury within the time provided and, if not
known, within a reasommale time after discovery1. Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Cono'n, 26
Ill. 2d 32, 185 N.E.2d 877 (1962). Under the prior Act it was fiund that there existed a conclu-
sive presumption that the employer was prejiudiced by a fiilure to give notice to him within the
required time. Ristow v. Industrial Comnm'n, 39 111. 2d 410, 235 N.E.2d 617 (1968).
126. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.6(c)(2) (1977). In Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial
Comnim'n, 26 Ill. 2(1 32, 185 N.E.2d 877 (1962), the court held that a liberal interpretation of the
requirement of notice to the employer should be allowed to the extent that it is consistent with
the employer's protection against unjust concealment of the claim. See also Thrall Car Mfg. Co.
v. Industrial Comto'n, 64 Ill. 2d 459, 356 N.E.2d 516 (1976) (notice to a plant nurse of an
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successfully interposed lack of notice as a defense, 127 probably because this
notice requirement is satisfied if there has been actual notice.128  This notice
requirement was held to be jurisdictional in its original form, 129 but the Act
injury, though incomplete, was adequate, as there was no evidence that the employer was
unduly prejudiced by any defect in notice); Sohio Pipe Line Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 63 III.
2d 147, 345 N.E.2d 468 (1976) (where an employer was informed of claimant's disability from a
heart attack, a subsequent statement from the employee that the heart attack was not work-
related did not estop the employee's later statement, that the heart attack arose out of his
employment); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 I11. 2d 68, 203 N.E.2d 569 (1964)
(though the notice given to the employer was not complete, it was not fraudulent nor was there
any indication of prejudice to the employer and therefore was adequate); Quaker Oats Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 414 III. 326, 111 N.E.2d 351 (1953) (where an employee told his foreman
on several occasions that cans had fallen on his foot, notice was considered sufficient, as it was
found to be the only notice that could be given at the time); Armour & Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 367 111. 471, 11 N.E.2d 949 (1937) (after notifying his company of an ammonia leak the
employee was found lying on the floor, overcome by the fumes, and he died shortly thereafter;
although no formal notice was given, the court found sufficient evidence that the employer had
notice of the accident within the required time).
127. In Andronaco v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 I11. 2d 251, 278 N.E.2d 802 (1972), the
employee died of a heart attack after suffering chest pains at work. The next day his widow
informed the employer that her husband had come home sick and died. The court held that
"the telephone call to the employer following Andronaco's death was the only notice given to
the City. However, we approved an identical form of notice in Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 291 II1. 616, 621, 126 N.E. 616, 618." Id. at 256-57, 278 N.E.2d at 805. See
Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 111. 2d 459, 356 N.E.2d 516 (1976) (adequate
notice when employee reported to the plant nurse complaining of knee trouble and requesting
to see the doctor); American Distilling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 40 I11. 2d 350, 239 N.E.2d
848 (1968) (notice found sufficient when employee reported the pain and injury to the company
nurse); Armour & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 367 111. 471, 11 N.E.2d 949 (1937) (formal notice
is not necessary if the employer has constructive or actual notice); Consumer Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 364 I11. 145, 4 N.E.2d 34 (1936) (a widow's suggestion that her husband may have
fallen into the river was held to be sufficient notice after the body was recovered from the
river); Ralph H. Simpson Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 337 Ill. 454, 169 N.E. 225 (1929) (actual
notice is sufficient). But see Fenix & Scisson Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 II1. 2d 354,
189 N.E.2d 268 (1963) (notice insufficient where nothing said about the accident).
128. Actual notice exists even if only notice of trauma is given when that trauma is only later
found to have caused an injury. In Quaker Oats Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 414 I11. 326, 111
N.E.2d 351 (1953), the employee complained to his foreman several times about cans dropping
on his foot, and the complaint was acknowledged. The employee, at the time, was not aware
that he suffered from a disease. Later, in a search for the cause of the disability, it was ascer-
tained that the injury arose out of his employmment. The court held that the notice prior to this
discovery was sufficient. The court stated:
[The] complaints to the foreman about the falling cans may have been defective
and inaccurate as a notice, but the facts were as apparent to the employer as to the
employee; there was no attempt at a concealment of claim nor was the employer in
any way prejudiced by the defect or inaccuracy, for it was well-acquainted with all
the facts and circumstances of the accident. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 291 Ill. 616, 126 N.E. 616 (1920); Valier Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
320 111. 69, 150 N.E. 651 (1926); Savin v. Industrial Comm'n, 342 I11. 41, 173 N.E.
802 (1930).
Id. at 337, 111 N.E.2d 351, 356.
129. Giving notice within forty-five days was jurisdictional and a prerequisite to the mainte-
nance of a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act. See, e.g., Ristow v. Industrial
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has since been greatly altered and liberalized by amendment. The prac-
titioner, however, should be aware that the suggestive "should" 130 of the
1975 amendment has been changed to a mandatory "shall" 13' with regard to
the need to give notice. It is unclear now whether absence of notice, as
opposed to defective notice, will be characterized as a "defect or inaccu-
racy" 132 and thus excusable absent a showing of prejudice to the employer.
The notice requirements of the Occupational Disease Act 133 are similar to
those of the Workmen's Compensation Act. A claimant under this statute
must give oral or written notice to the employer as soon as practicable after
the date of disablement.1 3 4  Defect or inaccuracy in the notice is not a bar
to the claim unless the employer proves that he has been, or will be, unduly
prejudiced thereby.135 More importantly, this statute makes clear that fail-
ure to give notice bars a claim only if the rights of the employer are sub-
stantially prejudiced. 136
The Workmen's Compensation and the Occupational Disease Acts also re-
quire that notice be given to the employer whenever the employee brings a
common law or statutory action arising out of an incident covered by either
act. 137 The employer must be notified by personal service or registered
Comm'n, 39 II1. 2d 410, 235 N.E.2d 617 (1968); Railway Ex. Agency v. Industrial Comm'n, 415
111. 294, 297, 114 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1953); Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Conim'n, 298 I11. 532,
534, 131 N.E. 637, 637-38 (1921).
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.6(c) (1975).
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.6(c) (1977).
132. Id.
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 172.31-172.62 (1977).
134. Id. § 172.41(c). This section requires that notice be given to the employer of the dis-
ablement arising from an occuptional disease. Notice must be given as required by the Work-
men's Compensation Act as soon as practicable after the date of disablement. Unlike the Work-
men's Compensation Act, however, there is no time limitaton set. Again, in the case of mental
incompetency, the time limitations do not begin to run until a conservator or guardian has been
appointed.
The similarities between the two acts extend even firther. First, liberality in the matter of
notice to the employer of injury will again be permitted to the extent it is consistent with the
employer's protection against unjust concealment of claim. Crane Co. v. Industrial Conins's , 32
111. 2d 348, 351, 205 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1965). Second, unless the employer would be unduly
prejudiced, defects or inaccuracies will be tolerated. In Crane, it was held that no prejudice
resulted to the employer where the employee failed to file a claim until three weeks -after his
release from the hospital and after his first diagnosis of silicosis. id. at 352, 205 N.E.2d at
427-28. See also Raymond v. Industrial Comm'n, 354 I11. 586, 188 N.E. 861 (1933) (a disabled
employee was not required to notify his employer that the disablement was due to lead poison-
ing when he did not know this until after the statutory time for notice had run; further, oral
notices to the employer within a week after the employee quit work because of the disablement
were sufficient).
135. Crane Co. v. Industrial Conum',, 32 Ill. 2d 348, 205 N.E. 425 (1965).
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.41(c) (1977).
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 9 138.5(b), 172.40(b) (1977). No common law actions Isay be
instituted against an employer or his agent by ans employee who is covered by the Workmen's
Compensation Act. In return for the employer's liability for compensation of employees, regard-
less of fault, under the Act the employer is granted immunity from common law actions. See
[Vol. 28:609
TORT CLAIM NOTICES
mail of the fact of suit and the name of the court in which it is being
brought. No statutory penalty attaches for failure to notify the employer, but
in practice it may result in a disruption of settlement negotiations.
Notice to the employer enables it to intervene in a civil suit, or in the
absence of suit and notice, to file a civil claim for indemnification against a
third party.' 3 8  In Public Litho Service Inc. v. City of Chicago, 139 a curious
result occurred with respect to such an indemnification claim. There, an
employer sought indemnification from the City of Chicago, but failed to
notify the City pursuant to section 8-102 until more than six months after
the accident.' 40 The notice was filed, however, within six months of the
Industrial Commission's approval of the employee's settlement contract. The
First District Appellate Court found that the employer was subrogated only
to the rights of the employee and that the notice period had commenced on
the date of the accident. 141 The rationale of this holding is especially weak.
One might readily foresee a situation in which the notice to the employer is
not sufficient to put it on notice that a public entity is involved and the
industrial claim is not brought until the municipal notice period has
elapsed. 1 42  Consequently, the employer might not be aware of its right of
indemnity until the right had become worthless.
The final significant notice requirement contained in the Industrial Acts
mandates that an illegally employed minor or his legal representatives file
notice with the Industrial Commission if he wishes to reject compensation
benefits in order to pursue a common law remedy. 143  This notice must be
Laffon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 27 I11. App. 3d 472, 327 N.E.2d 147 (5th Dist. 1975). It must
be noted that the employer-defendant has the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
employee was injured while performing his work-related duties. Lopez v. Galeener, 34 Il1. App.
3d 815, 819, 341 N.E.2d 59, 63 (5th Dist. 1975); Meador v. City of' Salem, 51 111. 2d 572,
578-79, 284 N.E.2d 266, 270 (1972). An employee, however, may bring a common law action
against a third party who is responsible for the employee's injury. In such cases, the employer
must be notified of the suit. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (1977). This gives the employer
a chance to intervene and join the employee's action. Villapiano v. Better Brands of Ill., Inc.,
26 11. App. 3d 512, 517, 325 N.E 722, 726 (1st Dist. 1975). See also Larson, Workmen's
Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 351 (1970).
The similarities between the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act
are apparent. No statutory or common law action may be brought against an employer by an
employee covered by the Occupational Disease Act to recover compensation for injury to his
health. The employee may bring an action against a person other than the employer for dam-
ages wlien disablement is caused by that person. Again, the employer must be notified and may
join the action to insure that all orders of the court are made for his protection.
138. See note 149 infra.
139. 8 Il. App. 3d 315, 290 N.E.2d 677 (1st Dist. 1972).
140. Id. at 316, 290 N.E.2d at 678.
141. Id. at 317-18, 290 N.E.2d at 679.
142. A coripensation claim can be brought against an employer for a period of three )ears
from the date of injury or two years from the last (late of payment of compensation. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, § 138.6(c)(2) (1977).
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1977). See Yerk v. Rockford Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
12 I11. App. 3d 299, 300-01, 298 N.E.2d 319, 321 (2d l)ist. 1973) (if a minor rejects his rights
under the Workmen's Compensation Act his common law remedies are preserved).
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filed within six months of the date of injury or death, or within six months of
the appointment of a legal representative, whichever occurs later. 144 Al-
though the statute does not require any specific form or content, filing
should be done personally at the Industrial Commission and the petitioner
or his lawyer should obtain a filing receipt in order to avoid the problem
encountered in Altont v. Byerly Aviation, Inc.,145 where the representative's
claim was dismissed by the trial court because the notice was lost in the
mail. 146
Federal employees must also provide notice of injury,147 but that notice
may be varied by regulation propounded by the Secretary of Labor. 148
These notice requirements are not construed as the power of the agency to
exercise regulatory power to destroy the precedential value of decisions there-
under. Consequently, lawyers must be aware of the statute, the regulations,
and the policy existing at the time the claim is presented in order to protect
their client's claim.
Another Illinois statutory notice provision that may be overlooked is that
which requires the personal representative of a deceased policeman or fire-
man to notify the municipality of any action taken to recover compensation
from a third party for the other's death. 149 Notice must be effectuated by
144. ILL. REx'. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1977). Under the 1967 version of this statute, the
six-monith period in which the ininor had to give notice o f his desire to reject the Workmen's
Compensation Act began to run froi0 the (late o which the eniployee was injured, iot from the
(late oi which a guardian was appointed. Estep v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 11 111. App. 3d
551, 553, 297 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ist Dist. 1973), aff'd, 57 111. 2d 395, 312 N.E.2d 618 (1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 110t9 (1975).
145. 44 Ill. App. 3d 571, 358 N.E.2d 396 (3d Dist. 1976), rev'd, 68 Ill. 2d 19, 368 N.E.2d
922 (1977).
146. 44 Ill. App. 3d 571, 572-73, 358 N.E.2d 396, 397 (3d Dist. 1976), rev'd, 68 Ill. 2d 19,
368 N.E.2d 922 (1977). In Aloni, the plaintiff represented an illegally employed minor who died
as a result of a work-related accident. The plaintiff, wishing to bring a common law tort action,
mailed the required rejectioi off workmen's compensation rights to the Industrial Commission.
The rejection notice was never received bv the Commission, nor was it returned to the plaintiff.
Ilie appellate court held that iotice was not timely because the Commission never received it.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that notice is filed timely if plaintiff
can prove, with coMpeteit evidence, that the letter containing notice was deposited, properly
addressed, in the United States mail on) or before the date due. Id.
147. 5 U.S.C. § 8119 (1977).
148. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 10.102 (1978).
149. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108-1/2, § 22-308 (1977). Where the death of a policeman or fire-
man was not caused b the negligence of the city or village but by the action of a third party,
legal proceedings may be taken against the third party notwithstanding any award made by the
city or village (for the death). If the personal representative of the deceased brings all action
against the third party and judgment is obtained or settlement is made, the amount received by
the personal representative shall be deducted from the city's award. The city has or may claim
lien upon any judgment or fund by which the representative may be compensated by a third
party for ail\ monev paid out of an award prior to judgment or settlemeit. Whe the personal
representative brings am actio against a third party, lie must uotify the city of such action h\
personal service or registered mail and must file proof of such notice. 'his permits the city to
join the action to insure that orders of the court are made for its protection. Id.
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personal service or registered mail and must include the name of the court
in which the suit is brought. 150 Again, no specific penalty is provided for
failure to comply, but failure may result in later complications because no
settlement, release, or satisfaction of judgment is valid without the written
consent of the municipality.151
Attorneys representing police officers should also be aware that a police
officer who is made a party defendant to a suit arising out of injury to person
or property while the officer is engaged in the performance of his duties
must notify his municipality in order to obtain indemnity from that en-
titv.152 The written notice must identify the suit and must be served within
ten days of the date of service of process.1 53  This notice is a condition
precedent to obtaining indemnity from the municipality.
A recent Illinois Supreme Court case, Cooney v. Society of Mount Car-
mel, 154 held that the notice requirement of the Local Governmental and
Governmental Tort Immunity Act is not applicable to private schools, but
rather, only applies to public schools. Therefore, failure to give pre-suit
notice of injury to a private school will not bai suit.
Commercial Notice
Another instance in which a statutory notice requirement is important oc-
curs when an injured plaintiff seeks to extend the period of limitation pur-
suant to the Uniform Commercial Code. 155 Although the Code uses the
150. Id.
151. No settlement, release, or satisfaction is valid without written consent of the city except
where the city or village has been folly indemnified or protected by order of the court. Id.
152. ILL. REX'. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-6 (1977). First, it must be noted that this section applies
only to municipalities having a population of fewer than 500,000. The section provides that a
unicipality will indemnify its police officers for judgments (not to exceed $100,000 including
the cost of the suit) received against them as a result of an injury to a person or property caused
by the officer (without contributory negligence on the part of the person or owner of the prop-
erty) while engaged in the performance of his duties. Note that this does not apply where there
has been willful misconduct on the part of the police officer. When a party defendant to such an
action, the officer must, within ten days of service of process, notif, the municipality by whom
he is or was employed of the action and the fact that he is a party defendant. The duty of the
municipality to indemnify any officer for judgment received against him is conditioned on re-
ceiving such notice. See Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort
Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nv. U.L. REV. 265 (1966).
153. The written notice shall include the name of the policeman, that he has been served
with process and made a party defendant to an action wherein it is claimed a person suffered
injury to his person or property caused by the policeman, title and number of the case, the
court wherein it is pending, and date on which the policeman was served with process. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-6 (1977).
154. 75 II1. 2d 430, 389 N.E.2d 549 (1979).
155. ILL. REX'. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-607 (1977). Section 2-607 pertains to notice that must be
given by a buyer to a seller who has breached the sales contract. A buyer who has accepted the
seller's tender must notify the seller of any breach within a reasonable time after discovery of
the breach or within a reasonable time after buyer should have discovered the breach. If notice
is not forthcoming, the buyer will be barred from any remedy. Furthermore, when the buyer is
sued for a breach of warranty or some other obligation for which the seller is answerable, buyer
1979]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:609
term "barred" when formulating time limits, there is almost always a ques-
tion of fact as to when the breach should have been discovered, and thus,
when notice should have been served, making at least summary disposition
unlikely.156 Neither particular words nor set form are required 157 in notify-
ing the seller. However, a reasonable notice is necessary in personal injury
cases, as well as in matters arising out of commercial transactions. 15  If no
notice has been given, a claimant may still preserve his right to sue if he can
show that the seller had actual notice of the incident which gave rise to the
dispute. This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that no particularity is
needed in the statutory notice, because its only purpose is to put the seller
on notice that the transaction is not closed to the satisfaction of all par-
ties.159 The reasoning of Dunbar v. Reiser 160 suggests that the seller is
estopped from utilizing a notice defense where he has actual notice of the
claim. 161
Perhaps the least known notice statute is the one which deals with the
sale of unregistered securities. A purchaser who wishes to void a sale must
serve notice on the seller within six months after learning that the sale is
voidable. 162  Notice must be given to each person from whom recovery is
may give seller notice of the litigation. If this notice states that seller may join the action and he
does not, he will be bound in any action against him bv the buyer. See Wagineister v. A. H.
Robins Co., 64 Il1. App. 3d 964, 382 N.E.2d 23 (1st Dist. 1978).
156. Branden v. Cerbie, 62 Ill. App. 3d 138, 379 N.E.2d 7 (1st Dist. 1978) (notice is ail
essential element of a cause of action based on breach of an implied warrant'; delay of fifteen
months was, as a matter of law, a reasonable time within which the plaintiff shoold have discov'-
ered the breach); Wilke Metal Products, Inc. v. David Architectural Metals, 92 III. App. 2d
265, 236 N.E.2d 303 (1st Dist. 1968) (notice of defect ini windows given by the corporation that
ordered them was not timely when given six months after corporation should have kniiis' of
breach).
157. Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415 (5th Dist. 1976)
(notification to seller of a defect need not be in any particular form bit notification is a questioni
of fact looking to all circumstances; held siflicient when given within a fTew days- after the
discovery of the defect).
158. Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 56 III. 2d 548, 555, 309 N.E.2d 550, 554-55 (1974);
Branden v. Gerbie, 62 111. App. 3d 138, 379 N.E.2d 7 (Ist Dist. 1978).
159. The comnmelits to ILL. RExV. STAT. ch. 26, § 207 (1977), state:
The content of the notification need inerelyv be sufficient to let the seller know that
the transactioni is still troublesome and must be watched. There is no reason to
require that the notification which saves the buyer's rights under this sectioi inist
include a clear statenent of all the objections that will be relied oi by the hover, as
onder tile section covering statements of defects upon rejection (§ 2-605). Nor is
there reason fi)r requiring the notification to be a claim for damages or of any
threatened litigation or other resort to a remedy. The notification which saves the
buyer's rights under this Article need onl, be suchi as infbrms the seller that the
transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and this opens the way for normal set-
tlement through negotiation.
160. 64 111. 2(d 230, 356 N.E.2d 89 (1976).
161. See note 108 and accompaiying text supra.
162. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.13(B) (1977). This section also provides that notice
nmust be given to each person fronm whom recovery will be sought. The notice mist be b'
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sought and must be delivered by registered letter or satisfied by personal
service. 16 3 Courts have construed this notice limitation as an equitable fea-
ture built into the statute to protect sellers against prejudice arising from
stale claims. 164 This interpretation, based upon the legislature's intent in
enacting the statute, would seem to support a claim that constructive or
actual notice to the seller would satisfy the notice requirements. No prece-
dent, however, can be found which directly supports this position.
registered mail, addressed to the person at his last known address, with the proper postage
affixed, or by personal service. This rule is not a statute of limitations but an equitable feature
designed to protect against stale claims and to prevent buyers who have sufficient knowledge of
this renedy from waiting to elect rescission. See Martin v. Orvis Bros. & Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d
238, 323 N.E.2d 73 (1st Dist. 1974); Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Il. App. 3d 514, 314 N.E.2d 549
(1st Dist. 1974) (where defendant admitted that the purchaser gave notice within twelve days
after learning that the purchase was voidable, defendant was precluded from contesting the
sale).
A purchaser mva void a sale of a security if it was made in violation of the Securities Law of
1953:
Every sale of a security made in violation of the provisions of this Act shall be
voidable at the election of the purchaser exercised as provided in subsection B of
this Section; and upon tender to the seller or into court of the securities sold or,
where the securities were not received, of any contract made in respect of such
sale, the issuer, controlling person, underwriter, dealer or other person by or on
behalf of whom said sale was made, and each underwriter, dealer or salesman who
shall have participated or aided in any way in making such sale, and in case such
issuer, controlling person, underwriter or dealer is a corporation or unincorporated
association or organization, each of its officers and directors (or persons performing
similar functions) who shall have participated or aided in making such sale, shall be
jointly and severally liable to such purchaser for (1) the full amount paid, together
with interest from the date of payment for the securities sold at the rate of the
interest or dividend stipulated in the securities sold (or if no rate is stipulated, then
at the legal rate of interest) less any income or other amounts received by such
purchaser on such securities and (2) the reasonable fees of such purchaser's attorney
incurred in any action brought for recovery of the amounts recoverable hereunder.
Notice of any election provided for in subsection (A) of this section shall be given
by the purchaser, within 6 months after the purchaser shall have knowledge that
the sale of the securities to him is voidable, to each person from whom recovery
will be sought, by registered letter addressed to the person to be notified at his last
known address with proper postage affixed, or by personal service.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 137,13(A)-(B) (1977).
163. ILL. REv. STA'r. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.13(B) (1978). A purchaser has six months after he
learns that the sale is voidable within which to give notice to the person from whom recovery
will be sought. See Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Il1. App. 3d 514, 314 N.E.2d 549 (1974). See also note
139 infra.
164. Gowdy v. Richter, 20 I1. App. 3d 514, 523, 314 N.E.2d 549, 556 (1974) (court denied
that plaintiff had constructive notice due to a bankruptcy petition filed two months -after the
stock purchase and held that notice given twelve days after plaintiff learned that the sale was
voidable was timely). See also Martin v. Orvis Brothers & Co., 25 II1. App. 3d 238, 323 N.E.2d
73 (1974) (plaintiff was held to have had sufficient knowledge to be put on inquiry of the non-
registered nature of securities purchased by him even before a consultation with his attorney
which confirmed the knowledge).
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Returning to tort law, it is unclear whether a public entity employee who
is injured on the job must serve notice pursuant to section 8-102 in addition
to the notice to the employer required by the Industrial Acts. 165  Such a
construction would appear counter to the very purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation 166 and Occupational Diseases Acts, 1 6 7 but the harsh and un-
imaginative construction utilized in some instances might make such an im-
plausible construction possible. Hecko v. City of Chicago 168 is illustrative of
this question. There, the court held that actions brought against public en-
tities pursuant to section 1-4-7 of the Illinois Municipal Code 169 were not
subject to the provisions of the Tort Immunity Act by virtue of section
2-101 170 of the latter Act.171 The Court of Claims Act's notice requirement
governs only actions commenced in that court 172 and, therefore, state
employees are not affected. Similarly, the notice requirements of the Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority Act1 73 apply only to actions to be commenced in
a court of law. 1
74
165. The Illinois Legislature has specified when notice must be given as it relates to the
individual employee and employer. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 138.6(c) (1977), the general rule is that notice of an accident must be given by the
employee as soon as practicable but no later than forty-five days after the accident. This rule is
modified for dependents of a deceased employee and in cases of injury caused by radiation.
Similarly, the Occupational Diseases Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.41(c) (1977), indicates
that notice of employee's disablement arising from an occupational disease shall be given as soon
as practicable. The commission reserves the right to bar further proceedings if a failure to give
such notice has prejudiced the rights of the employer. In both acts, notice requirements for
radiological harm are subject to a more liberal time schedule which is substantially coextensive
with the applicable statute of limitations.
166. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.6(c) (1977).
167. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.41(c) (1977).
168. 25 Ill. App. 3d 572, 323 N.E.2d 595 (1975) (plaintiffs brought actions against defendants
for their failure to serve notice of the demolition of plaintiff's jointly owned property and for
failure to serve notice of the proceedings leading to the demolition decree; judgimeni dismissing
plaintiff's suit was reversed and remanded to trial for determination of the issue).
169. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-7 (1977).
170. Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 85, § 2-101 (1977).
171. Hecko v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. App. 3d 572, 578, 323 N.E.2d 595, 599 (1975). The
statute provides:
Nothing in this Act affects the right to obtain relief other than damages against a
local public entity or public employee, based on:
c) The "Workmen's Compensation Act", approved July 9, 1951, as heretofore or
hereinafter amended;
d) The "Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act", approved July 9, 1951, as
heretofore or hereinafter amended...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-101 (1977). The issue was raised but not resolved in an earlier case,
City of Chicago v. Vickers, 8 II1. App. 3d 902, 291 N.E.2d 315 (1972). There the court indicated
that governmental immunity is "clearly" eliminated under § 1-4-7 of the Illinois Municipal Code
and that the legislature intended the Tort Immunity Act, where applicable, to prevail.
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.22-1 (1977).
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 341 (1977).
174. Id.
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Civil rights actions are also excluded from statutory notice require-
ments 175 because civil rights claims are not deemed to sound in tort. 176
Lawyers whose clients have delayed in seeking counsel, or who have them-
selves been dilatory, should be aware of this saving exception. It applies
when the defendants are government employees acting under color of state
law.177 In many instances tort claims might be pursued as civil rights
claims, thus avoiding the need to give notice.
It is interesting to speculate what result might have occurred historically
had Illinois courts initially tested for substantial compliance with the overall
purpose of the notice statutes rather than testing whether the requirements
of each individual subsection had been met. It is difficult, semantically and
logically, to argue that an erroneous date-of-occurrence entry in the notice
substantially complies with specific statutory requirements because it is near
to the actual date of occurrence. It is easier to justify a defective notice,
which has substantially complied with most of the statutory requirements, by
arguing that the general purpose of the statute has been satisfied. If the
notice statutes are' not construed to be jurisdictional, 178 then the more lib-
eral interpretation would seem easily justifiable, especially since the notice
requirements are in derogation of the common law and thus are to be
strictly construed against the public entity. 179
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT COMPARED WITH ILLINOIS
NOTICE PROVISIONS
The Federal Tort Claims Act, S° although different in form, provides the
federal government with an informational vehicle similar in purpose to that
provided by Illinois' statutory notice requirements. Prior to filing a claim
175. Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 1lI (N.D. I11. 1972) (the notice requirements of the Tort
Immunity Act not applicable to a civil rights action when the plaintiff claimed that a false arrest
deprived him of his constitutionally guaranteed rights because the Act governs only common
law tort actions).
176. Id. at 118-19.
177. The Civil Rights Act only protects individuals from state action. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976).
178. Lyons v. Chicago Transit Auth., 349 Ill. App. 437, 443, 111 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1953)
(statutory requirements of notice are not jurisdictional, and therefore defendant may waive,
without penalty, a requirement which is for his own protection and convenience).
179. Reynolds v. City of Tuscola, 48 111. 2d 339, 270 N.E.2d 415 (1971). In Reynolds, the
plaintiff filed suit against the defendant and served notice via registered mail, return receipt
requested. The trial court dismissed with prejudice because the mailed notice did not meet the
statutory requirement that notice be personally served. Id. at 340, 270 N.E.2d at 416. The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded stating that the statute was in derogation of the
common law and therefore was to he strictly construed against the public entities. Further, the
court held that substantial compliance in this case achieved the purpose of furnishing timely
notice. Id. at 342, 270 N.E.2d at 417.
180. The basic provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Procedure Act appear in 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b), 2671-80 (1976).
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under the Federal Act, but within two years of the date of the incident,18 1
the injured party must present the claim to the appropriate federal agency
for review. This allows the federal government the opportunity to obtain fill
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim prior to actual litiga-
tion. As a result, the government can investigate the claim fidly and make a
settlement offer if' it deems such advisable. One is also reminded that an
injured claimant must exhaust all administrative remedies as a condition pre-
cedent to bringing an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.1s2 Failure
to do so results in dismissal.183
Computation of the Periods of Limitation
The requirements of notice to the government and exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies as a condition precedent to filing suit 184 create not one, but
three, periods of limitation, all of them controlled by the filing and disposi-
tion of the administrative claim. First, there is the two-year period,18 5
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976) provides that -[a] tort claim against the United States shall
be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two
years after such claim accrues .... "
182. The requirement that an injured plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies as a
condition precedent to filing suit is established in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(2) (1976), which provides:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money
damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or emnployminent, unless the claimant shall have
first presented the claim to the appropriate frederal agency and his claim shall have
been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent b) certified or registered
imail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a clains within six months
after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a
final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. The provisions of this subsec-
tion shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure by third party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim.
This provision must be construed with 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976), which provides a further
limitation:
A tort claim against the United States shall he forever barred unless it is presented
in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years after such claim ac-
crues or unless action is begun within six osonths after the (late of mailing, by
certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to
which it was presented.
183. An action instituted prior to the exhaustion of the two year period will be dismissed as
being prensature if it is not first presented to and subsequently denied 1) the appropriate
federal agency. Cummins v. Ciccone, 317 F. Supp. 342 (W. D. Mo. 1970) (a prisoner on writ of
habeas corpus who complained about the conditions of his confinement had a premature claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976) since he failed to comply with its administrative require-
ments). Further, a claim must be filed within the two-year period and it must comply with the
administrative requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976), or it will be dismissed. See Blain v.
United States, 552 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs had not filed with the appropriate federal
agency, and since they were not a party to a class action previously filed, their claim was barred
for failure to file within the two year period prescribed by statute and for noncompliance with
the appropriate adlninistrative requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976)).
184. See notes 180-81 supra.
185. The time limit is measured from the date of accrual of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401())
(1976).
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within which the claim must be presented to the appropriate federal
agency.' 8" Second, there is the six-month period of time during which the
agency may consider the claim and an action against the United States may
not be brought in the absence of a denial of the claim. 187 Third, there is
the six-month period of time, 188 commencing with the denial of the claim by
the agency,' 8 9 during which the action against the United States must be
brought.19 0 Following the expiration of six months from the date of filing
the claim, an injured party whose claim has not been finally disposed may,
at his option, institute suit as if the claim had been denied. 191
These time constraints are important because, unlike the statutory notice
requirements of the Illinois statutes, the period within which a cause of ac-
tion can be filed against the United States is governed by the processing of
the administrative claim. The filing and disposition of the administrative
claim serve to inform the government of the claim and determine the limita-
tion period beyond which an action cannot be brought. The total period of
time between accrual and filing of the cause of action may be lengthened or
shortened by the timing of the presentation of the administrative claim. To
illustrate: assume that the injured plaintiff's cause of action accrued on
January 1, 1979. This date marks the commencement of the only fixed time
period, i.e., the two-year period within which the administrative claim must
be filed. 192 The claim must be presented on or before January 1, 1981. If
186. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1978). A claim is deemed presented to a federal agency when a
standard form or written notification of an incident plus a claim for damages is received. See
Steele v. United States, 390 F. Supp. 1109 (S.D. Cal. 1975), where a mere deposit of the
proper administrative claim forms in a mailbag was held not to be equivalent to receipt by a
federal agency, much less "presentment" within the meaning of the statutes. Id. at 1111. These
requirements have been strictly interpreted, and timely notice is one essential criteria for com-
pliance with the statute. In Prince v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Wis. 1960), the
court applied the majority view of the common-law rule of timing which provides that the
period will be computed by excluding the day of the event and including the last day of the
prescribed time period. Id. at 271.
187. Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1974) (claimant may not commence a
court action until the federal agency denies the claim within the six-month period, or the six-
month period expires without determination of the claim, whereby the failure to act is treated
as a final denial of the claim).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976) provides that "[a] tort claim against the United States shall
be forever barred . . . unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by
certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented."
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976) requires that the denial of the claim be in writing and sent
by registered mail.
190. Carr v. Veterans Administration, 522 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1975) (the six month period
during which an action must be begun is to be strictly construed when a waiver of sovereign
immunity is involved).
191. Mack v. United States Postal Service, 414 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Mich. 1976). (A plaintiff
has the power to determine the date on which the unanswered claim shall be deemed denied
for purposes of filing suit).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976).
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the claim is presented on January 1, 1981, and denied bv the Federal
Agency on July 1, 1981, the complaint must be filed by January 1, 1982,
resulting in a three-year period between accrual of the claim and filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, a claim presented January 2, 1979, and de-
nied January 3, 1979, would allow the claimant until' July 3, 1979, to file a
complaint, a period of approximately six months from accrual of the claim. If
the federal agency fails to make final disposition of a claim, the injured plain-
tiff may institute suit at any time after the expiration of the six-month period
allowed for agency consideration of the claim. Such failure extends indefi-
nitely the period of time during which an injured plaintiff is allowed to file a
cause of action. Practitioners should bear in mind the procedural and strate-
gically important relationship between the date or presentation of the claim,
the date of final disposition by the administrative agency and the resulting
time period within which the cause of action must be instituted.
Presentation of the Claim
If Illinois statutory notice provisions are a snare, then federal administra-
tive claim requirements present a pitfall for the practitioner. Attorneys ac-
customed to relying on statutes for notice requirements might easily over-
look the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations.' 93 Presentation
of a claim to a federal agency must be made by a claimant or his representa-
tive and should be made on a Standard Form, accompanied by a claim for
money damages in a sum certain.' 94  Although the regulations do not re-
quire that only Form 95 be used, 195 any other writing must contain all of the
information otherwise solicited by that form.196 Standard Form 95 requires
the claimant to identify himself, describe the occurrence, disclose all known
facts and circumstances surrounding the injury, set forth statements concern-
193. One regulation which governs the presentation of a claim to a federal agency provides
that:
For purposes of the provisions of Section 2672 of Title 28, United States Code, a
claim shall be deemned to have been presented when a federal agency receives from
a claimant, his duly authorized agent or legal representative, an executed Standard
Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for
money damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss of property, personal injury, or
death alleged to have occurred by reason of the incident. If a claim is presented to
the wrong federal agency, that agency shall transfer it forthwith to the appropriate
agency.
28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1978). Note also that "[e]ach agency is authorized to issue regulations
and establish procedures consistent with the regulations in this part." 28 C.F.R. § 14.11 (1978).
194. ld.
195. The regulations allow "some other written notification of ams incident." 28 C.F.R.
§ 14.2(a) (1978).
196. In Robinson v. United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972), recovery was
denied to plaintiff because he failed to complete the Standard Form 95 sent him by the defend-
ant. Further, he did not provide supporting documentation to substantiate his claim. The court
held that the omitted information was necessary to evaluate the claim and that a claim will be
barred when damages are not set out. Id. at 383.
[Vol. 28:609
1979] TORT CLAIM NOTICES
ing the nature and extent of the injury, report the names and addresses of
the witnesses, and state the amount of the claim. 197 It is also required that
a claim for personal injury or death be supported by the report of the at-
tending physician.1 98 This section also provides that each agency issue regu-
lations and establish its own procedures. 199 Therefore, a claim has been
duly presented when the agency receives an executed Standard Form 95
containing a demand for specific money damages, and when the claim is in
compliance with any additional requirements promulgated by the individual
agency. 20 0  Clearly, the filing of an administrative claim involves much more
than a simple notice of claim. 20 1
The avowed purpose of these regulations is to allow the administrative
agency to evaluate the claim, including the specific sum stated therein, and
settle the matter without the need for litigation. 20 2  Ostensibly, the Justice
Department is spared the burden of trying cases which might otherwise be
settled by negotiation with the agency involved. 20 3
Plaintiffs who fail to comply with the information requirements of the fed-
eral notice regulations face consequences similar to those experienced by
injured plaintiffs who have not complied with the Illinois notice statutes.
Failure to sign the form, 20 4 date the claim, 205 state a sum certain, 20 6 provide
197. Reprinted in 15 Lawyers Co-Operative Federal Procedural Forms § 63.21 at 331, 15
FED. PRoc. FORMs 331 (1978).
198. Id.
199. See note 193 supra.
200. The regulations promulgated by each agency must be complied with. Kornbluth v.
Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), illustrates that failure to provide reports of
attending physicians and medical bills, in addition to the necessary forms and applications, can
be atal to recovery on a claim for damages. Postal Service regulations specifically required
additional evidence and information. Id. at 1267. The court indicated that an agency may re-
quire additional information to achieve financial economy and relieve the judicial burden im-
posed by excessive Federal Tort Claims Act suits. Id. at 1268.
201. See Three-M Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977) (a
"Notice to Pay Rent or Quit Premises" served upon the Postal Manager of the post office in
plaintiff's building did not constitute an administrative claim against the United States as con-
templated by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976)).
202. In Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3rd Cir. 1971), the court stressed that:
The initial purpose of the regulations requiring a statement of the specified sum
claimed is to enable a determination by the head of a federal agency as to whether
the claim falls within the jurisdictional limits of his exclusive authority to process,
settle, or to properly adjudicate the claim. Above those limits the settlement must
have the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his designee.
Id. at 1050.
203. See Mudlo v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (W.D. Pa. 1976), where the court
noted:
The requirement of Title 28 U.S.C., § 2675(a), that a claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act must first be submitted to the proper administrative agency is aimed at
sparing the courts the burden of trying cases when an administrative agency can
provide a settlement procedure without litigation.
204. Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1049 (3rd Cir. 1971).
205. Id.
206. Id. The plaintiff in Bialowas was given a standard injury form on which he entered a
dollar sign and the words "neck, chest, and right arm" on the line where the personal injury
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documentation of the loss, 20 7 provide evidence of agency or representative
capacity,20 8 or supply information regarding insurance coverage, 20 9 has ren-
dered claims fatally defective. As a result of any of these defects, causes of
action have subsequently been dismissed. Courts have limited their analysis
of the information requirements to situations in which some necessary ele-
ment of information or documentation has been totally omitted.210 There-
fore, no general principal of substantial compliance has evolved, although it
has been made clear that the complete omission of a single element will
preclude utilization of the substantial compliance rationale. 2 11 Thus,
lawyers should attempt to comply with the information requirements of the
regulations in every detail.
The requirement that the injured person demand a sum certain in money
damages is significant, not only because it is a jurisdictional prerequisite, 212
but also because it affects the ultimate recovery of the claimant in a sub-
sequent lawsuit. Although an ad damnurn can generally be amended to con-
claim was to be stated. The court held this to be insufficient. Id. Accord, Driggers v. United
States, 309 F. Supp. 1377 (D.S.C. 1970) (written communications between the parties were
insufficient since they failed to make a claim for money damages).
207. Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Robinson v. United States
Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In Robinson, a definite amount of property damage
was claimed, but no supporting documents were provided.
208. Gunstream v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 366, 368 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (claim filed b\
plaintiff's parents with Post Office Department declared defective for failure to show parents
representative capacity). But see Young v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 736, 741 (S.D. Ga.
1974), where the court indicated that in certain limited situations, failure to include evidence of
representative capacity will not be fatal to a claim. These situations are where:
1) An administrative claim for death of a parent is filed for children by a purported
'guardian' or agent and is defective in failing to name the minors, to identify their
relationship to the decedent or to provide proof of the legal capacity and authority
of the person presenting such claim; 2) A proper claim is individually presented by
the surviving spouse of a decedent and such claimant neglects to name and include
as claimants children who possess a joint right of action for the death of their par-
ent.
Id. Accord, Locke v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 185 (D. Hawaii, 1972) (court noted a judicial
unwillingness to stand on technicalities once a claim has been filed, particularly where the
rights of children are involved and inequities result).
209. Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3rd Cir. 1971). It is not clear what emphasis
the court placed on the plaintiff's failure to submit the insurance information requested on the
Standard Form 95, but the failure was expressly noted.
210. With the sum certain requirement, courts have allowed some leeway. For example, in
Fallon v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Mont. 1976), it was held that "[w]here a
claim filed with a federal agency contains definite figures rendered uncertain by the use of
qualifying words, there seems to be no valid reason why the agencies and the courts cannot
treat the additional words as surplusage, leaving the certain amounts stated as the claim." Thus,
the claim "approximately $15,000" was allowed as a statement of a sum certain.
211. As expressed in Gunstream v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 366, 369 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
"[t]he conditions put upon the exercise of the privilege [of allowing the Federal Tort Claims Act
to impinge on the doctrine of sovereign immunity] created call for literal interpretation of the
procedure for filing an administrative claim and the time limitations applicable thereto.'
212. See note 202 supra.
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form to the damages awarded at trial, 213 the sum stated in the administrative
claim establishes an outer limit upon the amount of recovery in any sub-
sequent lawsuit. 214 The amount claimed administratively can be amended if
it can be shown that on the date of presentment the newly found evidence
could not have been discovered by reasonable means or if intervening facts
which relate to the amount of the claim can be proved. 215  Both of these are
burdens to demonstrate. 216  Federal regulations specifically state who may
properly present an administrative claim:
§ 14.3 Administrative claim; who may file.
(a) A claim for injury to or loss of property may be presented by the
owner of the property, his duly authorized agent or legal representative.
(b) A claim for personal injury may be presented by the injured person,
his duly authorized agent, or legal representative.
(c) A claim based on death may be presented by the executor or adminis-
trator of the decedent's estate, or by any other person legally entitled to
assert such a claim in accordance with applicable State law.
(d) A claim for loss wholly compensated by an insurer with the rights of a
subrogee may be presented by the insurer. A claim for loss partially com-
213. Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
[T]he court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
See generally Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952); Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA
Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1943). See also Couto v. Union Fruit Co., 203 F.2d 456 (2d
Cir. 1953) (amount of the verdict can exceed the ad damnum).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1976) provides:
Action under this section shall not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount
of the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the increased amount is
based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of
presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of interven-
ing facts, relating to the amount of the claim.
215. Id.
216. Thus, in Joyce v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 1242 (W.D. Pa. 1971), recovery was
allowed in excess of amount claimed on the basis of newly discovered evidence because plaintiff
had suffered subtle and complex injuries which required extensive physical, psychological, and
psychiatric examination.
Similarly, in Molinor v. United States, 515 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1975), proof of three knee
operations and ensuing treatment allowed a recovery $18,500 above the original $1,500 claim.
In Kielwein v. United States, 540 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976),
plaintiff filed a $25,000 administrative claim against the Department of the Navy, suing for
personal injuries suffered because of a Navy doctor's alleged negligence during a routine opera-
tion. At trial, the plaintiff argued that she had not known the true extent of her injuries at the
time of the claim. The district court agreed and awarded $123,000 on the basis of her severe,
permanent disability. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, prior to the claim, plaintiff
had consulted neurosurgeons and had obtained diagnoses which clearly indicated that the injury
was permanent; therefore, there were no intervening facts or newly discovered evidence on
which to base the increased award.
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pensated by an insurer with the rights of a subrogee may be presented by
the parties individually as their respective interests appear, or jointly.
(3) A claim presented by an agent or legal representative shall be pre-
sented in the name of the claimant, be signed by the agent or legal rep-
resentative, show the title or legal capacity of the person signing, and be
accompanied by evidence of his authority to present a claim on behalf of
the claimant as agent, executor, administrator, parent, guardian, or other
representative. 217
Unlike the Illinois notice requirements, infants and incompetents are not
excluded from the requirement of filing an administrative claim. The Federal
Tort Claims Act confers the right of action against the United States and the
limitations provisions contained therein establish the duration of this
right. 2 18
CONCLUSION
The stringent requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act have not been
tempered by judicial interpretation, and a liberal construction in the future
seems unlikely. Moreover, there has been no movement by Congress to
ease the requirements. In contrast, however, the Illinois notice provisions
have been construed so that their purpose is met and, at the same time,
justice is done.
It is to be hoped that Illinois courts will continue to expand the concept
that constructive or actual notice may satisfy statutory notice rather than
limit the liberal approach to the instances cited. In the future, courts will
find it increasingly difficult to justify a narrow approach where the recently
liberalized discovery rule2 19 is involved. The inequities created by strict
construction of statutory notice requirements are manifested by recent mal-
practice cases which raise the specter of an injured plaintiff who might not
know of his cause of action until after the statutory notice period has ex-
pired. The courts have employed various methods to avoid the harsh effects
of Illinois statutory notice provisions. 22 ° They have relied on the particular
217. 28 C.F.R. § 14.3 (1978).
218. Mann v. United States, 399 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1968); Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d
578 (9th Cir. 1965); Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
941 (1965). See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976).
219. See Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co., - I11. App. 3d __, 392
N.E.2d 1352 (1st Dist. 1979).
220. Had the statute been intended to include within the notice requirement any injury for
which a governmental body might be liable, the legislature would have used a broader term or
phrase, such as "injury," rather than the more exact word "accident," which limits the types of
injuries covered. See Eason v. Garfield Community Hosp., 55 Ill. App. 3d 483, 370 N.E.2d
1099 (1st Dist. 1977) (Simon, J., dissenting):
The rationale behind the notice requirement of the Tort Immunity Act is that it
facilitates prompt investigation and allows prompt settlement of meritorious claims.
[King v. Johnson, 47 I11. 2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970)] In this case, the hospital
would have had no real need to make an immediate investigation of the treatment
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facts of individual cases to avoid injustice and have employed other excep-
tions, such as waiver and estoppel, to the notice statutes. These develop-
ments should lead to the adoption of an all-encompassing actual-or-
constructive notice rule, ultimately promising injured plaintiffs escape from
the snare of notice.
of which plaintiff complains, since presumably the hospital's own records already
would have included all pertinent information. The hospital had full knowledge of
the facts, and full control of, and access to, all the relevant information, since it was
the hospital which provided the treatment.
The final, and perhaps critical, point bolstering this statutory interpretation and
result is simply that it is unrealistic to expect a patient to give the doctors treating
him, and the hospital caring for him, notice that he intends to sue them while he
still is under their care and supervision.
Even if the statutory interpretation I suggest (excluding injuries restilting from mal-
practice from the notice requirements of the Tort Immunity Act) is not followed,
and the plaintiff here was required to provide the notice called for by Sections
8-102 and 8-103, the question arises: When was he required to give the notice?
The next question becomes, then, that of discerning whether the plaintiff filed suit,
and thereby gave notice, within six months of the date his injury was received or
his cause of action accrued.
Because plaintiff may not have reasonably learned of his injury until immediately
prior to the time he filed his actual complaint, he may have filed suit, and so served
notice, within the requisite six-month period from the time his cause of action ac-
crued.
Id. at 489-92, 370 N.E.2d at 1103-06.

